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How deviations from FOMC’s monetary policy decisions affect bank profitability: Evidence 
from U.S. banking institutions 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper provides new empirical evidence on how Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) monetary policy decisions affect the profitability of U.S. banking institutions. It 
thereby provides a link between the literature on central bank monetary policy 
implementation through monetary rules and banks’ profitability. Using a novel dataset 
spanning the period 1990 to 2013, the empirical findings show that deviations of FOMC 
monetary policy decisions from a number of benchmark linear and non-linear monetary 
(Taylor type) rules exert a negative and statistically significant impact on banks’ profitability. 
The results are expected to have substantial implications for the capacity of banking 
institutions to more readily interpret monetary policy information and accordingly to reshape 
and hedge their lending behaviour. This would make the monetary policy decision process 
less noisy and, thus, enhance their capability to attach the correct weight to this information. 
Keywords: FOMC monetary policy rules: profitability; U.S. banks; linear and non-linear rules 
JEL Codes: E52; E58; G21; C33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Theoretical models emphasize the importance of private expectations in determining 
macroeconomic outcomes (King et al., 2008; Eusepi, 2010; Lamla and Maag, 2012; Givens, 
2012). Managing inflation and/or output expectations is a crucial feature of monetary 
policymaking, so the need for forward policy guidance is dramatically amplified, especially 
in crises periods. With a few exceptions, the majority of macroeconomic models feature 
private agent expectations of economic fundamentals that are formed independently of policy 
actions. There is a growing body of empirical evidence supporting the view that monetary 
policy actions, in fact, communicate information about the economy to the public, and 
thereby affect agents’ expectations or a number of institutions, such as banks. Usually, the 
policymakers have better information about the state of the economy than private agents, 
which captures the central banks’ private information about policy targets and their access to 
some confidential data. In such an environment, rational private agents (i.e., banks) gain 
information from observations on monetary policy actions that responds to these 
fundamentals. 
A signalling effect of interest rates on beliefs about the future output target alters 
optimal policy in a way that is similar to the case where policy affects agents’ beliefs about 
future policy through commitment. Moreover, given the delay between policy actions and 
their real effects, central bank communication provides policymakers with a way to promptly 
affect private expectations to shorten the transmission lags of monetary policy. It is also 
widely acknowledged that in spite of the overall very good performance of monetary policy 
to stay closely to a benchmark monetary policy rule, there have been several episodes of 
systematic deviations between the actual path of intervention interest rates and the implied 
rates by a monetary rule (mostly over the period prior to the Greenspan’s era).  
 
 
The goal of this paper is to investigate in what way deviations from FOMC monetary 
policy–tailed decision-making, spanning the period 1990-2013 has affected banks’ 
profitability. This paper is, to our knowledge, the first to deal with the explicit influence of 
such deviations of monetary policy decisions on banks’ profitability. Moreover, an additional 
novelty of the paper is that the time frame under consideration is of particular importance in 
light of the changing dynamics of the U.S. economy which has evolved through states of high 
inflation, low growth at the start of the Volcker era, to a ‘goldilocks’ period of low inflation, 
high growth in the Greenspan era, and onto the Great Recession of the Bernanke era and the 
recent financial crisis.  
The results are expected to be of high importance to a variety of economic agents as 
well as market participants. A greater understanding of the way those decisions can affect the 
profitability of banking institutions may allow market participants and banking institutions to 
revise their expectations more efficiently and rebalance their portfolios appropriately. 
Moreover, improved forecasting of interest rates would lead to a reduction in the volatility of 
the impact of such policy interest rate changes on certain components of the real economy, 
i.e. consumption, investment, lending and borrowing activity. To foreshadow our empirical 
findings, we find that monetary policy rule deviations have a significant negative impact on 
banks’ profitability. The results survived a number of robustness tests related to alternative 
types of policy rules, as well as the non-linear case when policy interest rates approach the 
Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) zone. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related 
literature. Section 3 outlines the data used in our study, while Section 4 details the empirical 
methodology and discusses the results of the empirical investigation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Monetary policy  
The strand of the literature our paper is fundamentally associated with both the role 
signalling channel in relevance to monetary rules in the central banks’ decision process and 
the implications of the deviations from such a rule. Faust and Svensson (2001) and Geraats 
(2007) focus on the effect of the signalling channel on the average inflation bias when the 
central bank has a positive output target. Walsh (2010) and Berkelmans (2011) study the 
signalling channel under dispersed information using numerical methods. Mertens (2011) 
shows that monetary policy signals only policy objectives, while Romer and Romer (2000), 
Campbell et al. (2012), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) show that positive interest rate 
surprises can have positive effects on inflation and output forecasts.  
Numerous types of monetary policy rules have been discussed in the literature, with 
such rules serving as benchmarks for policymakers in assessing the current stance of 
monetary policy and in determining a future policy path. The rule that has attracted the most 
attention is that of Taylor (1993), according to which, the instrument of the monetary 
authority reacts to two key goal variables: deviations of contemporaneous inflation from a 
pre-set target rate and deviations of contemporaneous real output from its potential level. The 
rule describes how central banks maintain low and stable inflation, while avoiding large 
output and employment fluctuations through interventions in the course of policy interest 
rates. The rule states that nominal interest rates react to the inflation deviation and the output 
gap, with the seminal contemporaneous rule specified as: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡 + φ(𝜋𝑡 − ?̅?) + 𝛾𝑦𝑡 + 𝑅                                                                               (1) 
where it is the federal funds rate target, R is the equilibrium real interest rate, 𝜋𝑡 is the 
inflation rate, ?̅? is the inflation target, and 𝑦𝑡 is the output gap (i.e., the deviations of actual 
 
 
GDP from its potential level).  We use real-time data that was available to policymakers 
when interest rate decisions were made by the Federal Reserve. Real-time GDP and GDP 
deflator data are obtained from the Philadelphia Fed. The data of the federal funds rate was 
replaced by the shadow federal funds rate (Wu and Xia, 2014) starting in 2009:Q1 in our 
study as the zero lower bound was adapted to the federal funds rate since then. The inflation 
was proxied by using the four-quarter percentage change in the GDP deflator while the output 
gap was calculated as the deviation from a real-time quadratic trend
1
.  
          A number of studies in this literature make use of the Taylor Rule to evaluate the 
efficacy of the central bank’s decision making process (Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, 2011; Ferrero, 
2012; Taylor, 2012; among others). This literature demonstrates that a simple monetary rule 
or its close variations approximate the policy decisions by central banks. Carlstrom and 
Fuerst (2003) note that the Taylor rule has had a big impact in the way the FOMC 
implements monetary policy, although they recognize that it is not used as a mechanical rule, 
but instead as a guide-post for monetary policy, thus, enhancing the central bank’s credibility 
in fighting persistent deviations from a target inflation rate. Batini and Haldane (1999) claim 
that the central bank has more information about the state of the economy at the time of 
decision making than is captured by inflation and output data alone, and it is also sensible to 
assume that central banks make policy decisions based on expected future economic 
conditions. For this reason, a number of researchers prefer forward-looking, or forecast-
based, policy rules in place of contemporaneous Taylor Rule methodology. However, there is 
not clear empirical evidence in support of forecast-based rules. Taylor (2000) notes that as 
long as forecasts are not too far into the future they will be very close to their 
contemporaneous counterparts.  
                                                          
1 For details of data construction, refers to Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2014). The authors also demonstrated 
that the real-time quadratic de-trended output gaps lead to a closer approximation of  “reasonable” real-time 
output gaps using Okun’s Law when compared to alternatives methods including real-time linear and Hodrick-
Prescott de-trending.  
 
 
 
Moreover, there are several reasons why policy may occasionally deviate from 
monetary rules. Liquidity crises that require a temporary injection of reserves by the central 
bank represent one reason why it might be desirable to temporarily lower the policy rate 
below the level prescribed by a simple rule. Another reason for deviating from rule-like 
behaviour might be a shock to the aggregate price level. Such a shock might normally call for 
a tightening of policy, but if the shock is seen as transitory, with no impact on inflation 
expectations, it might not require the response prescribed by a rule. Finally, policymakers 
may respond to economic indicators other than those incorporated in the simple rule. In short, 
a simple rule may simply not capture all of the contingencies that might confront 
policymakers (Taylor, 1993; 2008). Overall, the lack of flexibility is the main reason why 
central banks are reluctant to commit to a policy rule. As long as shocks to the economy are 
frequent and unpredictable, central banks need the flexibility to implement and communicate 
their monetary policy away from a pre-specified rule. 
The literature has dealt extensively with such deviations, essentially, in three major 
alternative approaches. First, there has been proposed a vast set of variations and 
enhancements to the explanatory variables in a benchmark monetary policy rule. Clarida et 
al. (2000) have replaced inflation with expected inflation (as policymakers need to be 
forward-looking because of the lags in the transmission of monetary policy), and have 
included lagged interest rate to account for policy inertia. Others, have enhanced the rule with 
a reaction to additional variables, such as asset prices (Sack and Rigobon, 2003), exchange 
rates (Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007), or long-term bond yields (Christensen and Nielsen, 
2009). A second approach describes the episodes in which the actual policy rates have 
deviated significantly from the interest rate implied by a monetary policy rule (Taylor, 2012; 
Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al., 2014). Finally, a third approach considers that deviations of 
actual policy rates from those in a monetary policy rule come from changes along time in the 
 
 
value of the parameters of the rule actually followed by policymakers. A number of studies 
have also investigated the stability of the U.S. Taylor rule (Bunzel and Wenders, 2010; Alcidi 
et al. 2011; Wolters, 2012). In this study, we make use of the first approach and we let the 
others for future research. Finally, Aguiar-Conraria et al. (2015) also assess U.S. monetary 
policy across time and frequencies in the framework of a Taylor rule. Their results uncover 
new stylized facts of the monetary rule that could have been detected with conventional time- 
or frequency-domain methods. 
2.2 Bank profitability 
The literature of banks’ performance has focused on identifying the determinants of 
dictate the behaviour of profitability. In particular, Neeley and Wheelock (1997) and 
Angbazo (1997) for the case of US banks document that bank’s profitability is positively 
affected by the default risk, the opportunity cost of non-interest bearing reserves, leverage, 
and management efficiency. Studies by Bashir (2000), Demerguc-Kunt and Huizingha (2001) 
and Abreu and Mendes (2002) use panel data and find that there exists a link between bank 
profitability and certain factors, such as the level of interest rates, the unemployment rate, 
bank concentration, type of ownership, leverage, loans to asset ratios, taxation, financial 
structure and development, legal indicators and stock market developments. 
 In a different strand of the literature, the English et al. (2014) paper seems to be close 
to what we have been doing in this study. They use pre-crisis period data and study the 
effects of changes in the level of policy rates on bank profitability. They show that following 
an unexpected increase in the level of policy rates, the positive effect on profitability is offset 
by a slowdown in asset growth and an outflow of core deposits, which represent an 
inexpensive source of funding compared to market alternatives. Yet a policy rate cut is 
typically associated with a steepening of the yield curve. This is consistent with the 
 
 
assumption that monetary easing is effective at boosting economic activity, which should 
increase inflation and growth expectations. 
3. Methodology and data 
For the purposes of the panel regression estimations we make use of a number of 
bank-specific control variables that could impact bank profitability. The control variables that 
can serve this goal include industry concentration (HERF), operating expenses management 
(OEM), liquidity risk (LIQ), cost efficiency (CEF), and financial leverage (FLVRG). The 
Appendix provides a detailed description of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
          In terms of our empirical model, we consider the above control variables of  bank  
interest  margins, motivated  by  the  dealership  model  (Ho  and  Saunders,  1981)  and  
which are  in  line  with  previous  empirical studies  on  the determinants  of  bank  interest  
margins. The first determinant is the Herfindahl index (HERF), which captures the market 
power for individual banks. The index is defined  as  the squares  of  individual  bank  asset  
shares  in  the  total  banking  sector  assets  for  an individual bank. The market power 
evidence argues that a higher (lower) level of concentration leads to more (less) 
monopolistic-type of profits, although higher (lower) concentration in the banking sector is 
associated with less efficient capital markets and, accordingly, with a slower reallocation of 
capital and, thus, with slower growth (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006). Other studies make use of 
the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) model that links market structure to the behaviour 
of banks and postulates a positive correlation between market power and profit. Goddard et 
al. (2004) as well as Hahn (2008), find a negative influence of the degree of competition on 
bank profits. The efficient structure hypothesis, by contrast, assumes that banks with superior 
management have lower costs and therefore higher profits. These banks will be able to gain 
market share over time, leading to a higher market concentration (Berger, 2007). As higher  
 
 
market  concentration  is  likely  to  contribute  to  higher  margins,  the  estimated  
coefficient  in  our model  is  expected  to  have  a  positive  sign.  
Operating expenses (OEM) also seem to play a substantial role as a determinant of 
bank profitability. Bourke (1989) provides evidence in favour of a positive relationship 
between the two variables. The operating costs on the interest margin is proxied by the ratio 
of non-interest expenses to total assets; a positive estimated coefficient is expected because 
higher operational costs may cause higher interest margins paid by the customers. We also 
adopted the ratio of equity to total assets (CAP) as a proxy for bank risk aversion (Maudos 
and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004) and capital strength; higher risk aversion may lead to 
higher margins, therefore, the estimated coefficient for CAP is expected to be positive.   
CRR  measures  the  credit  risk and asset quality  of banks,  and  is  proxied  by  the  
ratio  of  loan loss reserves  to  total  loans. Banks  with  higher ratios of loan loss reserves 
face  higher  credit  risk,  which  is  likely  to  be  transferred to customers, resulting in higher  
interest margins.  Credit risk is considered to be a significant determinant of profitability 
since it is related to the presence of bank failures. Jimenez and Saurina (2006) argue that 
bank’s lending hazards are much higher during the boom phase of a cycle than in the midst of 
a recessionary period. The literature offers a bunch of explanations for such behaviour, i.e. 
the principal agency problem through which managers aim at growth objectives instead of 
profitability targets (Mester, 1989). As a result, bank managers opt for higher loan growth 
and lower the quality loan standards. In addition, the herd behaviour hypothesis supports that 
bad loan mistakes cannot judged accordingly if the majority of bank managers commit them 
(Rajan, 1994). The institutional memory hypothesis also argues that in the long run, loan 
officers become less skilled or experienced to offer loans to high-risk borrowers (Berger and 
Udell, 2004). 
 
 
The total assets (TA) of the banks are used as a proxy for bank size.  Firm size is a 
variable that measures the presence of economies of scale in the industry and the ability to 
diversity portfolio risk. The factor of economies of scale could lead to positive coefficient for 
profitability while the second factor leads to negative coefficients if increased diversification 
leads to lower risk and thus lower required return, leaving the true coefficient unclear.  
A number of authors find a strong, negative correlation between a bank’s 
capitalization and its profitability (Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2004; Carbó Valverde 
and Rodríguez Fernández, 2007). The authors postulate a link between capitalization and risk 
aversion. According to this view, banks with a high level of capital and assets are more risk 
averse and ignore potential diversification options or other methods to increase profitability. 
Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) found that 10% increase in firm size decreases net 
interest margin by 0.6 percent.  And their result is in line with Kasman et al. (2010) and 
Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008). Therefore, we define size as total assets, proxying the size 
of operations; the sign of the estimated coefficient is ambiguous and depends on the net effect 
of associated credit risk and economies of scale.  
LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term funding, proxying the 
liquidity risk incurred by banks. The more the demand liabilities (i.e., customer and short-
term funding) of  the  bank  are  backed  up  by  liquid assets,  the  lower  the  liquidity  risk  
of  the  bank  and its interest margins. In other words, a negative sign is expected. We also 
include the efficiency ratio (CEF), known as the cost to income Ratio, which is an efficiency 
measure commonly used in the financial sector. Moreover, financial leverage (FLVRG) is 
measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. More borrowing may increase sales and 
productivity. By contrast, the greater the amount of debt, the greater the financial leverage, 
resulting in lower interest margin (Chen, 2013). Therefore, we do not have a particular prior 
regarding the expected sign of the coefficient.  
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Monetary rule estimates 
Following the existing literature (Taylor, 1993; Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. 2014), we 
assume equal weights of 0.5 assigned to both the inflation and output gaps, while the inflation 
target and the equilibrium level of the real interest rate are both equal to 2 percent; equation 
(1) turns to the original Taylor rule (OTR): 
𝑖𝑡 = 1.0 + 1.5𝜋𝑡 + 0.5𝑦𝑡                                         (2) 
An alternative monetary policy rule increases the size of the coefficient on the output gap 
from 0.5 to 1.0, to specify the following modified Taylor rule (MTR): 
𝑖𝑡 = 1.0 + 1.5𝜋𝑡 + 1.0𝑦𝑡                                             (3) 
The two policy rules described above may not be able to mimic the Fed’s behavior because 
the choice of parameters is rather subjective. The estimated Taylor rule (ETR) could be 
obtained by estimating the real-time data associated with Equation (2), and the monetary 
policy rule could be interpreted as the one favoured by the Fed. The specification of ETR is 
obtained from Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2014)
2
:  
𝑖𝑡 = 0.37 + 1.49𝜋𝑡 + 0.47𝑦𝑡                                       (4) 
               (0.30)     (0.07)       (0.05)                 
Figures in parentheses display standard errors. The estimates document that the coefficients 
on both the inflation and the output gap are close to those in the original Taylor rule 
(Equation 2). The forward-looking Taylor rule describes how central banks respond to the 
expected inflation deviations as well as to the expected output gap. Among the forward-
looking rules (FLR), the most prominent is that proposed by Clarida et al. (1998; 2000): 
                                                          
2
 The data for the calculation of interest rate deviation used in the paper can be downloaded at 
https://sites.google.com/site/alexrzhevskyy/files/data_rules_discretion.zip 
 
 
 
it = α + β[E(πt+n) − π̅] + γE(yt+q)                                                                                            (5) 
where β and γ are the coefficients for the inflation gap and the output gap, respectively. We 
also introduce a constant term α =  i∗ − βπ̅, where i∗ denotes the equilibrium nominal interest 
rate, and π̅ is the inflation target. Given the expected output gap (i.e., E(yt+q)), when the 
expected inflation rate is higher than the inflation target, the nominal rate is expected to 
increase and this will reduce investment and consumption plans, leading to reduced aggregate 
demand, and, consequently, to lower inflation. Therefore, a Taylor rule can provide a nominal 
anchor for the central bank to react to various shocks, as well as an automatic stabilizer for 
the macroeconomy.  
           To the empirical ends of this paper, we adopt two specifications of FLR; the first 
version simply assumes equal weights of 0.5 for both the inflation and the output gap, while 
in the second one, both the inflation target and the equilibrium level of the real interest rate 
equal 2 percent, yielding the following FLR: 
it = 1 + 1.5[E(πt+n)] + 0.5E(yt+q)                                    (6) 
where E(πt+n) and E(yt+q) are replaced by the data of output gap and GDP deflator forecasts 
obtained from Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2014).  An alternative FLR was also derived 
through the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) methodological approach (Castro, 2011; 
Clarida et al., 1998; Clarida et al., 2000; Apergis and Alevizopoulou, 2012).  The instrument 
list contains lagged values of inflation, the output gap, and interest rates.  
it = (1 − ρ)(α + βπt+1 + γyt+1) + ρit−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                           (7) 
Following Castro (2011) and after incorporating the interest rate smoothing process into the 
model, equation (7) yields the following reduced form: 
it = Ф0 + Ф1πt+1 + Ф2yt+1 + ρ it−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                     (8) 
where Ф0 = (1-) α, Ф1 = (1-) β, and  Ф2 = (1-) γ. Next, we consider deviations of the Fed 
Fund target from a benchmark nominal interest rate, as it is recommended through a Taylor 
 
 
(1993) rule
3
, and through the model described by Equations (2) through (6). Deviations of the 
actual Fed Fund rate from the target rate are defined as the absolute value of the deviation: 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                        (9) 
where FFRt is the actual Fed funds policy rate. The variable ABSDEV is the main 
independent variable of interest for the determinant of profitability in Equation (10).  
4.2. Baseline empirical analysis 
In this sub-section we provide baseline evidence on the role of the deviations of 
FOMC’s monetary policy decisions from a monetary policy rule on U.S. bank profitability. 
This analysis makes use of fixed effect panel estimations to evaluate the impact of those 
deviations on U.S. banks’ interest rate margins, along with the Hausman test that indicates 
the necessity of using the fixed effect estimator when compared to the random effect model:  
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐹𝐿𝑉𝑅𝐺𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝛽9 𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                (10)                                   
where  indices  i  and  t  denote  bank  and  year,  respectively,  NIMit is  the  net  interest  
margin  for  bank  i in  period  t,  αi is  the  fixed  effects  intercept,  and  ɛit is  the  i.i.d. error 
term. Net interest margin (NIM) is used as the dependent variable to measure bank 
performance/profitability, and it is the performance metric that examines how successful a 
bank's investment decisions are compared to its debt situations. A negative value implies that 
the bank did not make optimal decisions, because interest expenses were greater than the 
amount of returns generated by investments. The remaining variables are defined as above. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of  the  individual  variables,  as  well  as  the  expected  
                                                          
3
 We considered both current period and forward-looking versions of the Taylor Rule and find no qualitative 
difference in our profitability estimation results. Therefore, to the empirical needs of our paper, we will consider 
only a forward-looking monetary policy rule. The remaining results are available upon request. 
 
 
sign  of  their  impact on the bank’s performance based on the theoretical implications 
accepted. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Next, we determine the deviations from the benchmark monetary rule mentioned above 
(Equation 9). To this end, we first perform the estimation of a forward Taylor-type rule and 
then we proceed with deviations, measured as the difference between the Federal Funds 
target rate from an estimated forward Taylor Rule. The forward-looking rule specification 
incorporates GDP gaps and GDP deflator (inflation) forecasts obtained from Nikolsko-
Rzhevskyy et al. (2014).   
The empirical findings from the fixed effect model (10) and under the original Taylor 
rule (OTR) are reported in Table 2 (columns 1 and 2)
4
. They indicate that all estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% significance level, with the exceptions of the 
Herfindahl Index (HERF), the ratio of  total assets to equity (CAP), and LIQ (the ratio of 
liquid assets to customer and short-term funding), suggesting that only a handful of major 
players dominate the market over the period under study. Our most important finding is that 
the estimated coefficient of ABSDEV is negative, albeit low,  implying that a 1% deviation 
of the actual Fed’s fund rate from its target, derived in Equation (2), leads the profitability to 
drop by 0.04% (Column 2, Table 2).  
The estimated coefficient of TA is negatively significant, implying that the effect of 
credit risk dominates economies of scale. The sign of the estimated coefficient of OEM is 
positive, indicating that banks transfer their operational cost over to their customers by 
charging higher interest rates. The coefficient of CAP is also positive, illustrating that higher 
                                                          
4 This table presents fixed-effect estimates for the model with only control variables without interest rate deviation (i.e. 
model 1), and the model that incorporated interest rate deviation given by Eq. (2) from 1990 to 2013 for the 195 selected 
U.S. banks. In particular, Eq.(2) incorporated the original Taylor rule (OTR) of Taylor (1993): it = 1.0 + 1.5πt + 0.5yt. 
 
 
 
risk aversion leads to higher margins. The negative sign of LIQ confirms that the more the 
demand liabilities (i.e., customer and short-term funding) of the bank are backed up by liquid 
assets, the lower the liquidity risk of the bank is, and, therefore, the higher its interest margins 
are. The coefficient of CEF is negative, denoting that the lower the bank efficiency is, the 
higher is its profitability.   
Although credit risk (QUA) is a significant determinant of profitability, its coefficient 
turns out to be negative, implying that higher non-performing loans lead to higher losses, 
which adversely influence the banks’ available capital for further borrowing. The literature 
has provided mixed results on the expected sign of this particular coefficient. For the case of 
the U.S. banks, Miller and Noulas (1997) find a negative relationship, which represents that 
loans encounter a stronger risk profile. Alternatively, a negative coefficient could signal that 
banks are not using efficiently their set of diversified derivatives (i.e., futures, options, and 
swaps) to hedge counterparty credit risks (Jones and Pérignon, 2013). In that sense, their 
strategies to transfer such risks to other parties to avoid or reduce the negative impact of such 
risk and to accept some or all of the consequences of them turns out to be very inefficient 
(Boudriga et al., 2009; Afriyie and Akotey, 2012). Finally the hypothesis of Chen (2013) also 
receives statistical support, regarding the negative impact of FLVGR on bank’s profitability.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.3. Robustness checks: Dealing with the potential problem of endogeneity 
This section provides robustness checks of the findings reported in Table 2 through 
system general method of moment (SGMM) panel data estimates (Windmeijer, 2005) to 
handle the potential endogeneity.  Endogeneity issues among independent variables usually 
come from the presence of simultaneity bias, reverse causality and omitted variables. The 
issue of reverse causality may be apparent in our study as lower bank’s profitability may lead 
 
 
to wider monetary policy deviations. It is also possible that profitability could cause 
economies of scale and /or the presence of credit risks.  The use of system GMM estimation 
can overcome the endogeneity bias, after controlling for fixed and time effects, 
autocorrelation, and multiple endogenous variables (Windmeijer, 2005).   
We make use of the SGMM methodological approach because the usual dynamic 
GMM coefficients may cause the presence of bias in estimates with small samples, given that 
data are near unit root processes, while the selected instrumental variables are found to be 
weak. The Hansen test is used to check for the validity of the instruments in the GMM 
estimator. Instrumental variables (IVs) and residuals are not correlated under the null 
hypothesis that valid instrumental variables are included5.  We also adopt a two-step 
estimator, which is asymptotically efficient and robust to any pattern of cross-correlation and 
heteroskedasticity (Roodman, 2006). The new findings are reported in column 3 of Table 2.   
As we can infer, the estimates of SGMM (column 3), in terms of the sign of 
coefficients, are similar to those from the FE results (columns 1 and 2). Interestingly, both the 
size of the coefficient and its statistical significance increase in these SGMM estimations, 
while the majority of the control variables have turned to be statistically significant and the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients has turned to be more economically significant as 
well. The validity of the IVs estimates is checked through the Hansen test and the findings 
illustrate that all IVs are valid.  
Overall, the empirical findings provide new evidence that deviations of actual 
FOMC’s monetary policy decisions from a benchmark monetary policy rule are expected to 
reduce U.S. bank profitability. Taylor and Williams (2009) document how the federal funds 
rate, as well as interest rates on unsecured (i.e., uncollateralized) term loans between banks 
                                                          
5
 Both the one lagged bank profitability and the variable of provision to bank loan loss were 
used as IV instruments, because of the lack of information with respect to the exogeneity of 
regressors. 
 
 
diverge substantially from the central bank’s policy rates and remain unusually volatile for an 
extended period of time. Funding uncertainty leads to ‘risk synergies’ between the loan and 
deposit sides of a bank: an increase, say, in a bank’s deposit base reduces the funding risk 
exposure of further loan commitments, which in turn makes loans themselves more attractive. 
As uncertainty over funding conditions increases, these risk synergies become stronger, and 
the bank becomes more concerned with asset-liability management. This is related to an 
emerging literature on loan-deposit synergies (Kashyap et al., 2002; Gatev et al., 2009) that 
focuses on interactions between the two sides of a bank’s balance sheet.    
Furthermore, an increase in funding uncertainty induces highly extended banks with 
high loan-to-deposit ratios to essentially reverse their prior strategy, i.e. they cut back on their 
loan commitments, while at the same time try to attract a stronger deposit base with higher 
interest rates. This result is consistent with the behaviour of many commercial banks 
throughout the course of the recent financial crisis, including widespread reductions in the 
leverage and the shrinkage of balance sheets. Funding uncertainty has strong implications for 
bank profitability. In particular, increased uncertainty over funding conditions reduces banks’ 
expected profits. Moreover, loan-deposit synergies can lead to cross-subsidization where 
either loans or deposits business becomes a ‘loss leader’. In that sense, if the market for loans 
is very attractive relative to deposits, increased funding uncertainty may induce a bank to 
offer depositors an interest rate that exceeds its own (expected) funding rate. This implies that 
depositors’ welfare exceeds the level associated with a competitive market.    
For robustness purposes, Table 3 also provides both fixed effects and SGMM 
estimations for both the modified and the estimated rule (Equations (3) and (4), respectively). 
For the SGMM empirical findings, the results in the case of the modified rule show that the 
link is not significant. In terms of the estimated rule, the negative impact of deviations on 
bank profitability turns out to be 0.0333%.   
 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The forward-looking interest rate rule, based on our estimates, is reported in Table 4. The key 
results are associated with the estimates of the β coefficient, i.e., of the inflation gap, which is 
1.564, implying that the Federal Reserve raises interest rates to 56 basis points, if inflation 
rises by one percentage point. The coefficient of the output gap is positive as well, albeit 
smaller when compared to the coefficient of inflation gap. The interest rate smoothing 
parameter, ρ, is quite large, indicating that the central bank puts a significant weight to past 
values of interest rates. The J-test for over-identifying restrictions indicates that the 
instruments are valid in both versions of the rule. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 provides the empirical findings on the impact of new policy deviations on banks’ 
profitability in the case of the forward-looking rule. The results illustrate that a 1% absolute 
deviation of monetary policy decisions from this FLR policy rule reduces profitability by 
0.093% (column 2 in Table 5). Finally, the findings in terms of the remaining control 
variables remain consistently robust. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.4. Robustness checks: Monetary policy and the Zero Lower Bound  
To combat the financial turmoil and subsequent recessionary phenomena, major 
advanced countries have adopted monetary policies that keep the policy rates near zero; in 
that sense they attempt to manage expectations actively, to expand central banks’ balance 
sheets by purchasing long-term government bonds and risky assets, and to introduce schemes 
that facilitate bank lending (Lambert and Ueda, 2014). In theory, such monetary policies may 
benefit banks. In the short run, banks can gain from borrowing at low cost and investing in 
assets delivering higher returns, provided that policies do not depress the returns on those 
 
 
assets. Moreover, banks may take advantage of any reduction in term premia to replace short- 
with long-term debt and reduce the risk of maturity mismatches in their balance sheets (Stein, 
2012).    
By contrast, in the medium run, substantially easy monetary policies may hurt banks. 
The boost in spread income wanes as unconventional policies flatten the yield curve and 
reduce risk premia. Consequently, banks may rationally take extra leverage and risk (Borio 
and Zhu, 2008). This could happen, for example, with an extraordinary relaxation of 
collateral rules that makes funding available at low cost to all banks, regardless of the 
strength of their balance sheets. Furthermore, with low interest rates, banks may prefer to roll 
over loans to non-viable firms rather than declaring them non-performing and registering a 
loss in their income statement. Previous studies found evidence of such ‘ever greening’ 
policies in Japan in the 1990s and 2000s (Peek and Rosengren, 2003; Caballero et al., 2008). 
To achieve its monetary policy goals, the Fed implemented two forms of that type of 
policy. First, the use of forward guidance, whereby the Fed attempted to reduce and stabilise 
longer-term interest rates, by publically committing to maintaining the policy rate close to 
zero for an extended period of time. Evidence suggests this may have been ineffective in 
driving economic recovery (Anderson and Hoffman, 2010; Kool and Thornton, 2012). 
Second, the Fed also introduced Quantitative Easing (QE), where longer-term assets were 
purchased, in order to reduce long-term rates. Immediately following the announcement of 
Lehman’s demise, primary credit borrowing and Term Auction Facilities (TAF) lending 
increased markedly. The effectiveness of these actions is reflected in risk spreads, where both 
short- and long-term spreads, which had increased dramatically following Lehman’s 
announcement, declined markedly (Thornton, 2012). These actions indicate that even after 
the Fed fund target rate reached the zero lower-bound, the Fed remained aggressive in its 
policy actions. The effectiveness of monetary policy actions comes through the expectations 
 
 
effect, which seems to be particularly important when the Fed’s actions occur at a time when 
there are significant signs that financial markets need stabilizing mechanisms.  
The current hot issue concerning the new role of monetary policy after the recent 
financial crisis is not just about the effects of policy on inflation, but it is also about the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in helping the economy to recover from a recession. 
Moreover, another issue related to the role of low interest rates is the way the monetary 
authorities signal their intention to change future monetary policy in a credible way. This 
turns to be a very critical problem given that interest rates are set to zero, and thus, it is highly 
unlikely that monetary policy changes can signal a change of policy to the markets. Farmer 
(2012) shows that low interest rate policies could be effective in stabilizing inflation 
expectations. A standard monetary policy rule provides a unified framework to explain how 
monetary policy decisions can control inflation in normal times as well as to explain the 
target of monetary policy when policy attains the zero lower bound. To consider the 
monetary rule by taking explicitly into consideration the potential role of low interest rates, 
we make use of a non-linear (censored) rule expressed as: 
                it = max(if, it
*
) 
                it
*
 = a + β [ πt – π*] + γ yt               (11) 
where if denotes the floor of the Fed policy target rate, and it
* 
is the latent variable in the non-
linear Taylor rule, while the remaining independent variables are defined as in (2). We 
adopted a censored normal model that allows the nominal interest rate floor to change over 
time. We estimate it as a Tobit model with a nominal interest rate floor of 0%, 0.1%, 0.2%, 
0.3% and 0.4% as follows: 
 
 
 
                it = max(ift, it
*
) 
                it
*
 = a + β [πt – π*] + γ yt                  (12) 
Table 6 presents the fixed effects empirical results of bank profitability by taking explicitly 
into consideration the potential role of low interest rates, i.e. 0%, 0.1%, 0.2%, 0.3% and 0.4% 
respectively. The reason we focus on this part of the entire distribution of interest rates is that 
the Fed brought its policy rates to their respective effective lower bounds in a cold turkey 
fashion by decreasing them from 1% to 0.4% overnight (between January 10, 2008 and 
January 11, 2008). Given the experience of the post war period, the probability of 
experiencing a year as bad as 2008 had been exceedingly low (Williams, 2014). The negative 
impact of deviations in absolute values on bank profitability turns out to be 0.027% and 
0.024% for the lower bound rule of 0% and 0.4%, respectively (columns 1 and 5 in Table 6).  
In comparison to the results derived in the case of fixed effects estimation, the SGMM 
findings indicate a larger adverse influence of monetary policy uncertainty on bank 
profitability; where the negative impact of deviations in absolute values on bank profitability 
turns out to be 0.032% and 0.045% for the lower bound rule of 0% and 0.4%, respectively 
(columns 1 and 5 in Table 7). 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here] 
Overall, the results highlight that deviations from an optimal monetary rule at the Zero Lower 
Bound zone give rise to a credibility problem in which private agents expect any monetary 
expansion to be reverted once the economy has recovered (Krugman, 1998). Similarly, Jung 
et al. (2005) argue that deviations from an optimal commitment policy entail the break of a 
promise of zero nominal interests for some time after the economy has recovered. Based on 
the above arguments, the presence of such deviations is expected to increase interest rates and 
reduce lending activity, thus, contributing to lower bank profitability. Evans et al. (2015), by 
 
 
illustrating the presence of both an expectations and a buffer stock channel, argue that 
deviations of monetary policy from a monetary policy rule at zero policy rates are expected to 
have mixed effects for the overall profile of the economy; in particular, they can contribute to 
higher uncertainty, given that potential premature increases in interest rates raise the 
likelihood of adverse shocks, while delaying such increases for a long period could lead to an 
unwelcome surge of inflation. Based on those arguments we can infer that bank profits are 
reduced since banks are forced to cut down on their lending activity, which has negative 
spillovers on their profitability. By contrast, in the presence of low interest rates expected to 
boost economic activity, there will be likely positive effects on bank profits. Our empirical 
findings opt for the former arguments. 
4.5. Robustness checks: A forward-looking monetary policy rule that incorporates financial 
variables   
The effectiveness of monetary policy is also sensitive to the link between monetary 
policy and asset price movements. This link has been of perennial interest to both policy 
makers and academic researchers, since asset prices may affect real activity through the main 
channels of the transmission mechanism from asset prices to economic activity identified in 
the literature: i) households’ wealth effects on consumption expenditure, ii) Tobin’s Q effects 
on investments, and iii) financial accelerator effects on investments. Gilchrist and Leahy 
(2002) argue that the gains of including asset prices in monetary policy rules in practice adds 
little to stabilizing output and inflation. By contrast, while financial markets can benefit from 
FOMC monetary policy decisions through an informational mechanism that conveys 
expectations about the future course of interest rates. This mechanism allows market 
participants to revise their expectations about the impact of those interest rates on future asset 
prices, and, through the monetary transmission channels, to the real economy (Rosa, 2013).  
 
 
At this stage of the analysis we explicitly consider the role of asset prices in monetary 
policy rule as ‘information variables’, and the new model (i.e., augmented forward-looking 
rule) is the extension of Equation (8):  
 it = Ф0 + Ф1πt+1 + Ф2yt+1 + ρ it−1+𝜃1𝐶𝐵𝑡 + 𝜃2𝐻𝐼𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑆𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                 (13)                                               
where CB, HI, and SP denote 10-year corporate bond prices, housing prices, and stock prices, 
respectively. Considering a number of policy debates concerning the informational roles of 
asset prices in the Fed’s monetary policy, we choose as a comprehensive list of real asset 
prices, including  10-year corporate bond (i.e., Moody's Aaa rates), the all transactions 
housing index, and stock prices (i.e., S&P 500). Data on 10-year corporate bond prices are 
obtained from ‘The Federal Reserve Board of Governors in Washington DC’ database6.  
Housing prices are downloaded from ‘The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ database7. 
Finally, data on stock prices (i.e., S&P 500) are obtained from Robert Shiller’s website, with 
details of the data construction are being described on Shiller's website
8
.  The estimated result 
for Equation (13) is presented in Table 8.  
[Insert Tables 8 about here] 
We used the target rate in Equation (13) to estimate the impact of monetary policy deviation 
on bank’s profitability, and the SGMM results indicated that policy deviation has negative 
influence on banks’ profitability at 1% significant level (Table 9). The results implied that 
1% deviation of monetary policy decisions from a policy rule reduces profitability by 
0.082%. 
[Insert Tables 9 about here] 
                                                          
6
 visit http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm#fn14 
7
 https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USSTHPI/ 
 
 
 
The above results indicate that asset prices play a significant role in forward monetary policy 
rules as well as in deviations of monetary policy from forward optimal commitments as 
providing extra forward-looking information (Siklos et al., 2004; Semmler and Zhang, 2007). 
Their role as leading economic indicators tends to enhance not only the information provided 
to the banking sector in case that actual monetary policy decisions differ from their optimal 
commitments, but also their inclusion contributes more uncertainty, which could lead to 
lower liquidity levels in the economy. In either case, higher uncertainty prevails in the 
economy, and banks are forced to further cut their lending activity, which has a negative 
impact on their profitability. At the same time, higher uncertainty and lower liquidity could 
also lead to lower aggregate demand, resulting in lower demand for loans, thus, leading to the 
same conclusions in terms of bank profitability.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper attempted to examine the role of deviations of the FOMC monetary policy 
decision making process from a benchmark monetary policy (Taylor type) rule on back 
profitability. We utilised a novel dataset to examine the effectiveness of those decisions, 
controlling for a number of specific bank control characteristics, on the largest U.S. 
commercial banks through the employment of different linear and non-linear monetary policy 
rules, spanning the period 1990-2013.  
The empirical findings documented that such deviations of FOMC monetary policy 
decisions from all types of monetary policy rules that have been employed in the empirical 
analysis are highly important in understanding the FOMC decision-making process. Taken 
together, the results suggest that such deviations may question established central bank’s 
credibility to fight inflation; in that respect, it is possible to target other objectives for 
monetary policy, as set out in the Federal Reserve Act, for example, ‘maximum 
 
 
employment’. The implications associated with our empirical results could be that the 
banking sector can increase its capacity to more accurately utilize the information 
disseminated from the central bank, at least in the case of the U.S. banks. This would 
significantly reduce the uncertainty associated with monetary policy decisions enabling 
commercial banks to attach the correct weight to the information emanating from monetary 
policy decisions. This is important since the presence of uncertainty about the merit and the 
drivers of FOMC’s decisions is welfare reducing. Building on the results of this paper, a key 
direction for future research would be to explore how our modelling approach can be 
extended to other central banks, such as the Bank of England and the European Central Bank 
monetary policy committees. 
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Appendix 
Description of the variables and respective sources 
   
ROA Return on Asset is calculated as the ratio of its net income in a given period to the total value of its assets. 
  ROE Return on Equity net income returned  is defined as the ratio of shareholders equity.  
  NIM Net interest margin is a performance metric that examines how successful a firm's investment decisions are compared to its debt situations in percentage. A 
negative value denotes that the firm did not make an optimal decision, because interest expenses were greater than the amount of returns generated by 
investments. Calculated by-((Trailing 12M Net Interest Income + Trailing 12M Other Investments and Assets Sale) / (Earning Assets + Prior Year Earning 
Assets) / 2)*100 
NET_INCOME Earnings after deducting normal operating expenses, but before taking gains or losses from sale of securities, other losses and charge-offs, and additions to 
the reserve account for possible loan losses.  It refers to earnings before federal income taxes are paid.  
HERF Market concentration (the  Herfindahl-Hirschman index)  
  NIETA Ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets 
  CAP The ratio of  total assets to equity  
  QUA The ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans. 
  LA Logarithm of total assets 
  LIQ Ratio of short term borrowings to the sum of short and long term borrowings, total deposits and repurchase agreements, expressed in percentage. 
Calculated as: 
 
[ST Borrowings / (Customer Deposits + Short and Long Term Debt)]*100 
 
 
 
where: 
 
ST Borrowings is BS047, BS_ST_BORROW 
 
Customer Deposits is BS041, BS_CUSTOMER_DEPOSITS 
 
Short and Long Term Debt is RR251, SHORT_AND_LONG_TERM_DEBT 
 
 
EFFR Efficiency Ratio (also known as Cost to Income Ratio) is an efficiency measure commonly used in the financial sector.  The Efficiency Ratio measures 
costs compared to revenues.  Unit:  Actual. 
 
Calculated as: 
 
(Operating Expenses / ((Net Interest Income + Commissions & Fees Earned + Other Operating Income (Losses) + Trading Account Profits (Losses) - 
Commissions & Fees Paid) + Taxable Equivalent Adjustment or Net Revenue - Net of Commissions Paid) * 100 
 
where: 
 
Operating Expenses is IS032, IS_OPERATING_EXPN 
 
Net Interest Income is RR016, NET_INT_INC 
 
Commissions & Fees Earned is IS019, IS_COMM_AND_FEE_EARN_INC_REO 
 
Other Operating Income (Losses) is IS020, IS_OTHER_OPER_INC_LOSSES 
 
Trading Account Profits (Losses) is IS017, IS_TRADING_ACCT_PROF 
 
Commissions & Fees Paid is IS024, IS_COMM_FEE_PAID 
 
Taxable Equivalent Adjustment is IS100, IS_TAX_EQV_ADJ 
 
Net Revenue - Net of Commissions Paid is IS954, NET_REV_EXCL_COMMISSIONS_PAID 
    
FLVRG Financial Levergage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets 
 
 
Table 1 
           Variable description, descriptive statistics and expected impact on the bank interest margin               
Variable 
 
Notation 
 
Mean Standard Maximum Minimum 
Jarque-
Bera 
 
Expected 
 
     
deviation 
  
Statistics 
(prob.) 
 
Sign Obs. 
            Net interest margin  NIM 
 
4.002 0.904 12.000 0.520 0.000 
  
3362 
Herfindahl index HERF 
 
0.031 0.283 4.499 0.000 0.000 
 
+ 3362 
Ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets OEM 
 
2.880 0.939 9.760 0.198 0.000 
 
+ 3362 
The ratio of  total assets to equity  CAP 
 
9.930 3.403 60.606 0.586 0.000 
 
+ 3362 
The ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans. CRR 
 
0.600 0.909 13.710 -1.970 0.000 
 
+ 3362 
Logarithm of total assets TA 
 
8.272 1.561 14.698 3.952 0.000 
 
? 3362 
Ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term funding LIQ 
 
7.248 7.858 89.290 0.000 0.000 
 
- 3362 
Cost to Income Ratio CEF 
 
61.352 17.770 552.350 11.670 0.000 
 
+ 3362 
Financial Leverage Ratio FLVRG 
 
11.524 4.935 134.690 1.530 0.000 
 
? 3362 
Monetary policy deviation (original Taylor rule) DEV 
 
-0.990 1.303 1.275 -3.638 0.000 
 
? 3362 
Monetary policy deviation (original Taylor rule: absolute value) ABSDEV   1.295 1.000 3.638 0.041 0.000   ? 3362 
 
 
Table 2 
Estimated results on Net Interest Margin: orignal Taylor rule 
 
Notes: This table presents both fixed-effects and SGMM estimates for the model with only control variables without interest 
rate deviation (i.e. model 1), and the model that incorporated interest rate deviation given by Eq. (2) from 1990 to 2013 for 
the 195 selected U.S. banks. In particular, Eq.(2) incorporated the original Taylor rule (OTR) of Taylor (1993): it = 1.0 +
1.5πt + 0.5yt. ABSDEV denotes the absolute deviations of the Notes: The first two models in this table presents fixed-effect 
estimates for the model with only control variables without interest rate deviation (i.e. model 1), and the model that 
incorporated interest rate deviation given by Eq. (2) from 1990 to 2013 for the 195 selected U.S. banks. In particular, Eq.(2) 
incorporated the original Taylor rule (OTR) of Taylor (1993): it = 1.0 + 1.5πt + 0.5yt. ABSDEV denotes the absolute 
deviations of the actual Fed Fund rate from the target rate (i.e. derived from OTR). A Hausman test where the null 
hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects, the p-value for Hausmen test is 
smaller than 0.05 for all models, suggesting that fixed-effect model is more appropriate for our data set.  NIM, HERF, 
NIETA CAP, QUA, LA, LIQ, EFFR, FLVRG, ABSDEV denote Net interest margin, Herfindahl index, Ratio of non-interest 
expenses to total assets, The ratio of total assets to equity, The ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans, Logarithm of total 
assets, Ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term funding, Cost to Income Ratio, Financial Leverage Ratio, and 
Monetary policy deviation in absolute value respectively. Model (3) incorporates the original Taylor rule (OTR) with system 
GMM estimators. **, *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
      (1) (2) (3) 
 
VARIABLES Control variables Original Rule 
Original Rule: 
SGMM 
         
 HERF 0.0391 0.0301 0.184** 
 
 
(0.112) (0.113) (0.088) 
 NIETA 0.355*** 0.351*** 0.947*** 
 
 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.108) 
 CAP 0.0114 0.0102 0.0733** 
 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.033) 
 QUA -0.0471** -0.0506*** 0.0555* 
 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.030) 
 LA -0.388*** -0.383*** -0.210*** 
 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.027) 
 LIQ -0.00351 -0.00296 0.00727 
 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
 EFFR -0.0134** -0.0136** -0.0455*** 
 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
 FLVRG -0.0185*** -0.0188*** 0.0125 
 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014) 
 ABSDEV 
 
-0.0399*** -0.0317** 
 
  
(0.010) (0.015) 
 Constant 7.160*** 7.211*** 3.888*** 
 
 
(0.315) (0.310) (0.562) 
 P-value for Hausmen test  0 0 
  Z-value for Hensen test 
  
0.583 
 Observations 3,362 3,362 3,157 
 R-squared 0.386 0.391 
  Number of id 195 195 192 
 Bank FE YES YES 
  
 
 
Table 3. Estimated results on Net Interest Margin: Modified and estimated Taylor rule 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Modified 
model 
Estimated  
model 
Modified model: 
SGMM 
Estimated 
model: 
SGMM 
          
HERF 0.0265 0.0380 0.129 0.186** 
 
(0.111) (0.112) (0.330) (0.0881) 
NIETA 0.359*** 0.355*** 1.045* 0.954*** 
 
(0.0733) (0.0725) (0.581) (0.108) 
CAP 0.00944 0.0114 0.0697 0.0771** 
 
(0.00813) (0.00831) (0.247) (0.0314) 
QUA -0.0541*** -0.0473** -0.0124 0.0597* 
 
(0.0191) (0.0192) (0.210) (0.0315) 
LA -0.352*** -0.388*** 0.0602 -0.215*** 
 
(0.0316) (0.0313) (0.331) (0.0282) 
LIQ -0.00338 -0.00341 -0.00608 0.00873 
 
(0.00291) (0.00300) (0.0284) (0.00546) 
EFFR -0.0137** -0.0134** -0.0517 -0.0456*** 
 
(0.00552) (0.00546) (0.0372) (0.00735) 
FLVRG -0.0187*** -0.0185*** 0.0705 0.0134 
 
(0.00401) (0.00420) (0.142) (0.0142) 
ABSDEV_M -0.0468*** 
 
-0.0354 
 
 
(0.00884) 
 
(0.158) 
 ABSDEV_E 
 
-0.00525 
 
-0.0333* 
  
(0.0124) 
 
(0.0169) 
Constant 7.004*** 7.173*** … 3.828*** 
 
(0.305) (0.316) … (0.544) 
P-value for Hausmen 
test  
0 0 
  Z-value for Hensen test 0.05 0.518 
     Observations 3,362 3,362 3,157 3,157 
R-squared 0.396 0.386 
  Number of id 195 195 192 192 
Bank FE YES YES 
       
Notes: This table presents fixed-effect and SGMM estimates for the models that incorporated interest rate deviation 
given by Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) from 1990 to 2013 for the 195 selected U.S. banks. In particular, Eq.(3) incorporated the modified 
Taylor rule (MTR) of Taylor (1993) that increases the size of the coefficient on the output gap from 0.5 to 1.0:  it = 1.0 +
1.5πt + 1.0yt. Eq.(4) incorporated the estimated Taylor rule (ETR) where data was obtained from Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. 
(2014):  it = 0.37 + 1.49πt + 0.47yt. The ETR estimates document that the coefficients on both the inflation and the 
output gap are close to those in the original Taylor rule Eq.(2). ABSDEV_M and ABSDEV_E denote the absolute deviations of 
the actual Fed Fund rate from the target rate (i.e.as derived from MTR), and the absolute deviations of the actual Fed Fund 
rate from the target rate (i.e. as from ETR) respectively. A Hausman test where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model 
is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects, the p-value for Hausmen test is smaller than 0.05 for all models, 
suggesting that fixed-effect model is more appropriate for our data set. Mode(3) and model(4) provide system GMM 
estimates.**Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  
Interest rate rule estimates 
          
 
    Ф0     Ф1     Ф2      Α      β     γ      ρ J-statistic 
probability 
R-squared 
                  
          FLR -0.0177 0.1287*** 0.0633*** -0.2156 1.5641 0.7702 0.9170***    0.99   0.944 
                    
The key results for forward-looking rule given by Eq.(8): it = Ф0 + Ф1πt+1 + Ф2yt+1 + ρ it−1 + 𝜀𝑡, where Ф0 = (1-)α, Ф1 
= (1-)β, and Ф2 = (1-)γ. Under the Taylor rule principle (i.e., the β coefficient should be greater than unity), and given that 
β is equal to 1.564, the Fed manages to raise nominal as well as real rates. The coefficient of the output gap is positive as 
well, albeit smaller when compared to the coefficient of the inflation gap. The interest rate smoothing parameter, ρ, is quite 
large, indicating that the central bank puts a significant weight to past values of interest rates. The J-statistic in the case of 
the Taylor-type and the forward-looking rule indicates that the employed instruments are valid. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Estimated results on Net Interest Margin: Estimated forward-looking Taylor rule 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Forward-Looking Rule 
Forward-Looking Rule: 
SGMM 
      
HERF 0.0458 0.183** 
 
(0.110) (0.087) 
NIETA 0.363*** 0.970*** 
 
(0.071) (0.103) 
CAP 0.0127 0.0837*** 
 
(0.008) (0.030) 
QUA -0.0480** 0.0389 
 
(0.019) (0.028) 
LA -0.356*** -0.188*** 
 
(0.031) (0.027) 
LIQ -0.00525* 0.00130 
 
(0.003) (0.006) 
EFFR -0.0133** -0.0435*** 
 
(0.005) (0.007) 
FLVRG -0.0182*** 0.0154 
 
(0.004) (0.014) 
absdev_flr -0.106*** -0.0930** 
 
(0.029) (0.045) 
Constant 6.920*** 3.440*** 
 
(0.319) (0.479) 
P-value for Hausmen test  0 
 
Z-value for Hensen test 
 
                           0.518 
   Observations 3,362 3,157 
R-squared 0.391 
 Number of id 195 192 
Bank FE YES 
    
Notes: This table presents both fixed-effects and SGMM estimates for the models that incorporated interest rate deviation 
given by Eq. (8) from 1990 to 2013 for the 195 selected U.S. banks. In particular, Eq.(8) incorporated the forward-looking 
rules (FLR): it = Ф0 + Ф1πt+1 + Ф2yt+1 + ρ it−1 + εt   , where Ф0 = (1-) α, Ф1 = (1-) β, and  Ф2 = (1-) γ. 
ABSDEV_FLR denotes the absolute deviations of the actual Fed Fund rate from the target rate (i.e.as derived from FLR). A 
Hausman test where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects, the 
p-value for Hausmen test is smaller than 0.05 for all models, suggesting that fixed-effect model is more appropriate for our 
data set. Model (2) provides system GMM estimates.***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Fıxed effect results on net interest margin: Non-linear  rule 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Zero lower 
bound:0% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.1% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.2% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.3% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.4% 
            
HERF 0.0337 0.0348 0.0343 0.0344 0.0345 
 
(0.113) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
OEM       0.3530***       0.3530***       0.3540***       0.3540***       0.3540*** 
 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
CAP 0.0110 0.0111 0.0114 0.0113 0.0113 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
CRR    -0.0486**    -0.0481**    -0.0478**    -0.0478**    -0.0479** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
TA      -0.3870***     -0.3880***      -0.3830***      -0.3840***     -0.3840*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
LIQ -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0033 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
CEF     -0.0135**    -0.0135**     -0.0135**    -0.0135**     -0.0135** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
FLVRG      -0.0187***      -0.0187***       -0.0186***     -0.0186***      -0.0186*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ABSDEV_0     -0.0270** 
    
 
(0.011) 
    ABSDEV_1 
 
-0.0204* 
   
  
(0.011) 
   ABSDEV_2 
  
   -0.0249** 
  
   
(0.012) 
  ABSDEV_3 
   
   -0.0243** 
 
    
(0.011) 
 ABSDEV_4 
    
    -0.0236** 
     
(0.011) 
Constant        7.2040***       7.2010***       7.1630***      7.1670***       7.1700*** 
 
(0.313) (0.314) (0.312) (0.312) (0.312) 
      P-value for 
Hausmen test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 3,362 3,362 3,362 3,362 3,362 
R-squared 0.388 0.387 0.387 0.387 0.387 
Number of id 195 195 195 195 195 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES  
This table presents fixed-effect estimates for the models that incorporated interest rate deviation given by Equation (12) from 
1990 to 2013 for the 195 selected U.S. banks. In particular, Equation (12) considers several lower bound interest rate by 
setting the floor of the Fed policy target rate  (i.e. if)  to 0%, 0.1%, 0.2%, 0.3% and 0.4%  respectively. ABSDEV_0, 
ABSDEV_1, ABSDEV_2, ABSDEV_3 and ABSDEV_4 denote the absolute deviations of the actual Fed Fund rate from the 
0% lower bound policy, 0.1% lower bound policy, 0.2% lower bound policy, 0.3% lower bound policy and 0.4% lower 
bound policy, respectively. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. SGMM Estimated results on Net Interest Margin: Non-linear rule 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIAB
LES 
Zero lower 
bound:0% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.1% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.2% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.3% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.4% 
 
Zero lower 
bound:0.1% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.1% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.2% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.3% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.4% 
 
Zero low r 
bound:0.2% 
Zero l wer 
bound:0.1% 
Zero l wer 
bound:0.2% 
Zero l wer 
bound:0.3% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.4% 
 
Zero lower 
bound:0.3% 
Zero l wer 
bound:0.1% 
Zero l wer 
bound:0.2% 
Zero l wer 
bound:0.3% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.4% 
 
Zero lower
bound:0.4% 
Zero l wer 
bound:0.1% 
Zero l wer 
bound:0.2% 
Zero l wer 
bound:0.3% 
Zero lower 
bound:0.4% 
 
            
HERF 0.185** 0.185** 0.185** 0.185** 0.185** 
 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.087) 
NIETA 0.952*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 
 
(0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) 
CAP 0.0753** 0.0757** 0.0788** 0.0786** 0.0784** 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
QUA 0.0572* 0.0588* 0.0609* 0.0608* 0.0606* 
 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
LA -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.210*** 
 
(0.028) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
LIQ 0.00776 0.00801 0.00679 0.00692 0.00705 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
EFFR 
-
0.0453*** -0.0455*** -0.0463*** -0.0463*** -0.0463*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
FLVRG 0.0123 0.0128 0.0141 0.0141 0.0141 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
ABSDEV
_0 -0.0323** 
     (0.015) 
    ABSDEV
_1 
 
-0.0318** 
    
 
(0.015) 
   ABSDEV
_2 
  
-0.0464*** 
   
  
(0.014) 
  ABSDEV
_3 
   
-0.0457*** 
  
   
(0.014) 
 ABSDEV
_4 
    
-0.0450*** 
     
(0.014) 
Constant 3.831*** 3.841*** 3.861*** 3.864*** 3.866*** 
 
(0.539) (0.546) (0.525) (0.527) (0.529) 
      Z-value 
for 
Hensen 
test 0.544 0.533 0.504 0.507 0.508 
Observati
ons 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157 
Number 
of id 192 192 192 192 192 
      
 
 
Notes: This table presents SGMM estimates for the models that incorporated interest rate deviation given by Eq. (12) from 
1990 to 2013 for the 195 selected U.S. banks. In particular, Eq.(12) considers several lower bound interest rate by setting the 
floor of the Fed policy target rate  (i.e. if)  to 0%, 0.1%, 0.2%, 0.3% and 0.4%  respectively. ABSDEV_0, ABSDEV_1, 
ABSDEV_2, ABSDEV_3 and ABSDEV_4 denote the absolute deviations of the actual Fed Fund rate from the 0% lower 
bound policy, 0.1% lower bound policy, 0.2% lower bound policy,   0.3% lower bound policy and 0.4% lower bound policy 
respectively. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Interest rate rule estimates with asset prices 
                    
          
 
    Ф0     Ф1   Ф2      Α      β     γ      ρ J-statistic 
probability 
R-squared 
                  
          FLR -4.957 0.6334 0.2350 -11.1890 1.4291 0.5319 0.4430     0.99     0.824 
                    
Notes: The key results for forward-looking rule given by Eq.(13):  it = Ф0 + Ф1πt+1 + Ф2yt+1  +  ρ it−1+𝜃1𝐶𝐵𝑡 + 𝜃2𝐻𝐼𝑡 +
𝜃3𝑆𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where Ф0 = (1-)α, Ф1 = (1-)β, and Ф2 = (1-)γ. Under the Taylor principle (i.e., the β coefficient is greater 
than unity), and given that β is equal to 1.429, the Federal Reserve accomplishes to raise nominal as well as real rates. The 
coefficient of the output gap is positive as well, albeit smaller when compared to the coefficient of inflation gap. The J-
statistic in the case of the Taylor-type and the forward-looking rule indicates that used instruments are valid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. 
Estimated results on Net Interest Margins: with asset prices 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
Forward-Looking Rule  
with asset prices 
Forward-Looking Rule  
with asset prices: SGMM 
 
      
HERF 0.0296 0.171** 
 
(0.112) (0.084) 
NIETA 0.355*** 0.944*** 
 
(0.073) (0.106) 
CAP 0.0114 0.0741** 
 
(0.008) (0.031) 
QUA -0.0359* 0.0943*** 
 
(0.020) (0.032) 
LA -0.368*** -0.204*** 
 
(0.031) (0.027) 
LIQ -0.00393 0.00504 
 
(0.003) (0.005) 
EFFR -0.0134** -0.0451*** 
 
(0.005) (0.007) 
FLVRG -0.0185*** 0.00877 
 
(0.004) (0.014) 
ABSDEV_AP -0.0691*** -0.0816*** 
 
(0.016) (0.017) 
Constant 7.086*** 3.932*** 
 
(0.310) (0.490) 
P-value for Hausmen test 0 
 Z-value for Hensen test 
 
0.557 
Observations 3,362 3,157 
R-squared 0.392 
 Number of id 195 192 
Bank FE YES 
   
Notes: This table presents fixed-effect and SGMM estimates for the models that incorporated interest rate deviation given by 
Eq. (13) from 1990 to 2013 for the 195 selected U.S. banks. In particular, Eq.(13) incorporated the forward-looking rules 
that augmented with asset prices: it = Ф0 + Ф1πt+1 + Ф2yt+1 + ρ it−1+𝜃1𝐶𝐵𝑡 + 𝜃2𝐻𝐼𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑆𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   , where CB, HI, and 
SP denote 10-year corporate bond, housing index, and stock prices respectively. ABSDEV_AP denotes the absolute 
deviations of the actual Fed Fund rate from the target rate as obtained from Eq.(13). A Hausman test where the null 
hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects, the p-value for Hausmen test is 
smaller than 0.05 for all models, suggesting that fixed-effect model is more appropriate for our data set. Model (2) is 
estimated using system GMM estimator. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.  
